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Abstract
Mainstream organizations typically struggle in their quest to combine effectiveness with efficiency, or
reliability with flexibility. Experimentation and trial-and-error are regarded as important processes
for organizational learning, but do not always lead to an organizational-wide optimum in terms of
efficiency. Certain organizations, so-called High Reliability Organizations (HROs), exist that operate
in hazardous environments but manage to structure themselves to be efficient and stay highly reliable.
These organizations in high-tension industries are deprived from the luxury of going through trialand-error learning, but we state that exactly this is accountable for the HROs’ success. Through a
case study of the IT Incident Management process at a large European financial services provider, we
investigate how people involved in a process of such a mainstream organization, where reliability is of
great concern, can learn from HROs to achieve a greater reliability while working efficiently. It
appears that the characteristics that make an HRO distinct from other organizations are – at least to
some extent – present in the IT Incident Management process. Our main conclusion however is that
considerable opportunities remain unseized to lift the HRO qualities to a still higher level.
Keywords: Incident Management process, Organizational learning, High Reliability Organizations.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Today’s organizations are characterized by ‘raplex’ – rapidly evolving and complex – contexts in
terms of technology, competition, legal and institutional obligations (Nooteboom, 1998). Only those
organizations survive and prosper that are capable of dealing with these raplex conditions.
Organizations need to be flexible in order to respond to raplex conditions swiftly or, even better,
anticipating them (Hong et al., 2004). In organization theory, this paradigm is known as
‘Organizational Learning’. An organization that demonstrates organizational learning in a durable and
semi-continuous way is known as a ‘Learning Organization’ (LO).
From an efficiency perspective, it can be said that an organization’s components have to be tightly
coupled (Wolf, 2001). Indeed, when the processes between individuals, subunits, ideas, procedures,
hierarchical levels (Orton & Weick, 1990) are integrated as far and smoothly as possible, costs will be
the lowest, time will be saved and the least energy and resources will be wasted. Through
organizational learning’s highly praised processes of trial-and-error (Aase & Nybø, 2005), the
aforementioned organizational components learn which activities yield the highest performance for
themselves and the organization as a whole.
Paradoxically, because of the difficulty to realize the necessary mutual adjustments, organization
members notice that the probability of achieving the ideal situation of tight-coupling on an
organization-wide level is too low to be worth striving for. Moreover, they realize that such a strategy
would go at the expense of their own component’s efficiency. For this reason, actions are often
adjusted in view of a sublevel’s optimum (Denrell). The result is a sub-organizational optimum and an
organizational suboptimum, the overall result being a loosely coupled and not optimally efficient
organization.
High Reliability Organizations (HROs) are organizations that have histories of very safe operations
although they operate in environments where accidents could have an enormous impact (Roberts &
Libuser, 1993), like aircraft carriers (e.g. Rochlin et al., 1987) and organizations in the nuclear
industry (e.g. Roberts, 1990). HROs are exhibiting a rare combination of reliability and flexibility, of
effectiveness and efficiency (Van Den Eede et al., 2004).
We argue that because of the absence of ‘trial’-and-error learning in these high hazard environments,
the actors in HROs will not ‘learn’ that it is wiser to pursue their own optimum. Instead, they will
continue to pursue the image of a tightly-coupled organization. The result thereof is efficiency. As
such, we state that the fact of being deprived from the luxury to go through a lot of trial-and-error
learning is accountable for the HROs’ success. However, as we have mentioned above, organizations
do not only need to be efficient, they need to be reliable as well. This calls for a balancing act between
tighter and looser coupling. As we will see, HROs exhibit five different antidotes for tight-coupling.
The result is an organization that combines the best of tight-coupling with the best of loose-coupling.
In this contribution we want to investigate how an organization operating in raplex conditions can
learn from HROs in being both efficient and reliable, despite the fact of an absence of organizational
learning’s characteristic trial-and-error processes.
In the subsequent section we will describe HROs and their characteristics that make them highly
reliable while staying efficient. Next, we will present a case study of the IT Incident Management
process at a large financial institution. Through an ethnographic study we examined how they can
learn from HROs to balance both virtues of reliability/effectiveness and flexibility/efficiency.
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2
2.1

HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS
Introduction

An organization is exposed to all kinds of threats from various internal and external sources. The
organization may protect itself from these threats, but threats can still cause an organizational accident,
as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1997)
James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1997) is a metaphor stating that an organization’s barriers of
defense can be thought of as the slices of a Swiss Cheese. Each defense is not always functioning
optimally and may contain holes, which are at different ‘locations’ in the different slices. In addition,
when one hole is plugged, another one may emerge elsewhere. If at one point in time, all holes happen
to line-up, a latent danger becomes manifest as it bypasses all built-in defense mechanisms causing an
organizational accident.
Organizations operating under high-risk circumstances are very vigilant on avoiding accidents,
because their occurrence would have disastrous consequences, either for the organization itself or for
the public. Despite the fact that they operate under trying conditions, they have less than their fair
share of accidents (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 9). Such organizations are labeled “High Reliability
Organizations” (HROs) and can be identified “by asking the question: ‘How often could this
organization have failed with dramatic consequences?’. If the answer to the question is many
thousands of times, the organization is highly reliable.” (Roberts, 1990)
Processes in HROs are distinctive because they focus on failure rather than success, inertia as well as
change, tactics rather than strategy, the present moment rather than the future, and resilience as well as
anticipation (Weick et al., 1999).
Early characterizations of HROs emphasized the total elimination of error, while later on researchers
concluded that errors are inevitable and HROs are not error-free, but that errors do not disable them
(Weick, 1987; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 14). Effective HROs are known by their capability to
contain and recover from the errors they make and by their capability to have foresight into errors they
might make. Reliability is the number one concern for HROs (Weick et al., 1999; Roberts, 1990).
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2.2

Characteristics of High Reliability Organizations

HROs are so reliable because they have a certain state of ‘mindfulness’ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p
42). According to Weick et al. (1999), mindfulness is less about decision-making, which is the
traditional focus of organizational theory and accident prevention, and more about inquiry and
interpretation grounded in capabilities for action. HROs possess five key qualities to reach their state
of mindfulness (Weick et al., 1999), represented in Figure 2. These qualities enable HROs to
compensate for their inherent tight-coupling with attributes that loosen their coupling, hence
contributing to a balance between efficiency and reliability. Through their preoccupation with failure,
reluctance to accept simplifications, and sensitivity to operations, HROs are able to anticipate and
become aware of dangers. HROs are able to contain dangers when they are spotted because they are
sensitive to their operations, committed to resilience and deferred to expertise.
Preoccupation
with Failure

Reluctance to
Simplify

Mindfulness

Mindful
anticipation
Capability to Discover
Unexpected Events

Sensitivity to
Operations

Commitment
to Resilience

Reliability

Capability to Manage
Unexpected Events
Mindful
containment

Deference to
Expertise

Figure 2. A Mindful Infrastructure for High Reliability (adapted from Weick et al., 1999)
In the remainder of this section, we outline the different HRO principles that make up the mindfulness
of an HRO, drawing heavily from the extensive body of research by Weick and co-workers (Weick et
al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).
Preoccupation with failure
Preoccupation with failure is an important principle that gives HROs a distinctive quality, for HROs
are preoccupied with something they seldom see. Although HROs are successful in avoiding incidents,
they do not boast about their superiority. HROs are wary for the common failures after success, caused
by restricted search, reduced attention, inertia, risk aversion, and homogeneity. They treat even the
smallest error as a sign that something could be wrong with the system, i.e. with one of the defense
layers, and they are anxious that the holes in the cheese might line up. HROs regard close calls as a
kind of failure that reveals danger, and not, as most other organizations would do, as evidence of
success and their ability to avoid accidents. Members of HROs know that they cannot foresee
everything: They know that they do not know, and they expect to be surprised. That is why members
of HROs are constantly worried that they make analytical errors and that these errors might be
amplified, in combination with limitations to foresight, and lead to accidents.
Reluctance to simplify
HROs take deliberate steps to create more complete and differentiated pictures of what is going on.
Because HROs believe that the world they face is complex, unstable, unknowable, and unpredictable,
they try to notice as much as possible. Simplifications produce blind spots, so HROs differentiate in
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order to get a more varied picture of potential consequences and in turn a richer and more varied set of
precautions and early warning signals.
HROs make fewer assumptions, cultivate requisite variety and socialize people to notice more. The
law of requisite variety was originally proposed by Ashby (1958), and suggests that the larger the
variety of actions available to a system, the larger the variety of perturbations in its environment it can
compensate. HROs stimulate frequent job rotation and hire employees with non-typical prior
experience. By these means HROs obtain a broader divergence of perspectives, which leads to a
broader set of assumptions that sensitize it to a greater variety of inputs. Diverse groups have more
information available than more homogeneous groups, but communication patterns and cognitive
limitations often lead to a situation where unique information does not get shared. Unique knowledge
must be surfaced. Rutkowski et al. (2006) studied the use of a group decision support system (GDSS)
to identify unique but hidden knowledge that resides in a group. This unique knowledge appeared to
be of key importance and would not have been shared without the use of the GDSS.
Sensitivity to operations
HROs try to signal errors when they are still tractable and can still be isolated by attaining welldeveloped situational awareness. Situational awareness is defined by Endsley (1997) as “the
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space; the comprehension
of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”. Sensitivity to operations is about
the overview of the ‘Swiss Cheese’ and constantly trying to find out where the holes are located in the
cheese. HROs consistently communicate the big picture of what the organization seeks to do, and try
to get everyone to communicate with each other about how they fit in the big picture (Roberts & Bea,
2001). With a situational awareness and a big picture, people in HROs can make continuous
adjustments that prevent errors from accumulating and enlarging.
Sensitivity to operations is achieved through a combination of shared mental representations,
collective story building, situation assessing with continual updates, knowledge of physical
interconnections and parameters of the organization’s systems, and active diagnosis of the limitations
of preplanned procedures.
Commitment to resilience
Resilience is a combination of keeping errors small and improvising workarounds to keep the system
functioning. People in HROs are so committed to resilience, that they see this ‘firefighting’ as
evidence that they are able to contain the unexpected. In contrary, managers in business may perceive
successful firefighting as evidence that they are distracted and therefore unable to do their normal
work (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 70).
HROs need to have a broad repertoire of actions they can make use of when a danger occurs. HROs
support improvisation to be able to recombine the actions in their repertoire into novel combinations.
As Wildavsky (1988 p 70) describes, “improvement in overall capability, i.e. a generalized capacity to
investigate, to learn, and to act, without knowing in advance what one will be called to act upon, is a
vital protection against unexpected hazards”. Informal networks are a common resource for HROs to
respond to dangers resiliently, because they provide an infrastructure that is needed to handle
unanticipated dangers in a swiftly manner. When events get outside of normal operational boundaries,
knowledgeable people organize themselves into ad hoc networks to provide expert problem solving.
Deference to expertise
What people in HROs have mastered is the ability to alter typical hierarchical patterns of deference
when the tempo of operations changes and unexpected problems arise. Decisions are then made on the
front line by people who have the most expertise, regardless of their rank. In these situations, expertise
and experience are usually more important than rank, so the decision structure in HROs is a hybrid of
hierarchy and specialization. This shift to anarchy comes from a collective, cultural belief that the
necessary capabilities lie somewhere in the system and that migrating problems will find them.
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3

CASE STUDY: THE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PROCESS

3.1

Introduction

Financial institutions are supposed above all other virtues to be trustworthy (Heller & Willatt, 1977 p
11). The fundamental commodity in which financial institutions deal is not money but confidence, and
a loss of confidence, unlike loss of money, cannot be dealt with simply by a write-off in the balance
sheet (Heller & Willatt, 1977 p 16). In other words, a financial institution must be reliable.
In this section, we report on an extensive research program we conducted of the IT Incident
Management process at a large European financial services provider active in the fields of banking and
insurance. The objective of our research was to investigate how the people involved in the Incident
Management process can learn from HROs to achieve a greater reliability. The financial institution has
branches all over the world and offers its services to millions of clients, individual clients as well as
retail clients and multinational companies. The financial institution holds a Euro zone top 20 ranking
in terms of market capitalization. The financial institution’s IT department employs about 2,000
people.
The Incident Management process is part of a larger framework for best practices in IT service
management, the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL). The primary goal of the
Incident Management process is to restore normal service operations as quickly as possible and to
minimize the adverse impact on business operations, thus ensuring that the best possible levels of
service quality and availability are maintained. An incident is defined as “any event which is not part
of the standard operation of a service and which causes, or may cause, an interruption to, or a
reduction in, the quality of that service” (Central Computer & Telecommunications Agency, 2000 p
71). This can vary from smaller incidents (e.g. a printer that does not work) to incidents with a higher
impact (e.g. a mainframe failure).
3.2

Organization of the Incident Management process

Figure 3 shows the organization of the Incident Management process at the financial institution.
Incident Management Hierarchy

Organizer
=Incident Manager

Financial institution

Business
Department

Division

Incident
handling team

Incident
handler

Incident
handler

Incident
handler

Service Delivery

=Owner (SDO)

IT Department

Incident
handling team

Division

Division

Incident
handling team

Incident

=Coordinator (IC)

=Team leader

Incident
handler

Figure 3. Organization of the Incident Management process
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Coordination across the IT department
The financial institution has a special Service Management division that coordinates the ITIL
processes throughout the organization. One of the Service Management division’s staff members is the
Incident Management process owner, in ITIL referred to as the Incident Manager. The Incident
Manager is responsible for the efficiency and effectiveness of the Incident Management process. The
Incident Manager monitors the Incident Management process, maintains the Incident Management
application, and makes recommendations for improvement. The financial institution uses a special IT
Service Management application suite, Peregrine Systems’ ServiceCenter, which is designed to
support ITIL’s best practices.
Organization within service domains
The financial institution offers many services to their customers, e.g. asset management activities,
financial transactions, and online banking. To support all these services, many internal services have
to be in place. The financial institution has split up all her activities into service domains, and each of
the over 70 service domains maintains one internal or external service. Every service domain has a
Service Delivery Owner (SDO), who is responsible for supporting the service domain by the IT
department. The SDO has a good overview of all activities within a service domain, from the IT
department to the users in the business divisions, and is therefore an important contact person when
incidents occur in a service domain. In literature on organization theory this role is known as
‘boundary spanner’ as it enables transgressing the departmental boundaries (Williams, 2002).
Organization within divisions of the IT department
Each division has its own Incident Coordinator (IC), who is responsible for the Incident Management
activities within his division. The IC coordinates the Incident Management activities of the teams in
his division and communicates with the SDO when a higher priority incident occurs. ICs provide the
Incident Manager of recommendations for improvement of the Incident Management process.
Organization within incident teams
Each incident handling team has a team leader who is the contact person for the team.
3.3

Incident handling process

Once an incident is detected, it goes trough different steps before it can be closed.

Ownership
monitoring, tracking and communication

Incident detection
and recording

Classification and
assignment

Investigation and
diagnosis

Resolution and
recovery

Incident closure

Figure 4. The Incident life cycle
(adapted from Central Computer & Telecommunications Agency, 2000)
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It is important to note that an incident is constantly monitored by the owner of an incident, who makes
sure the agreed resolution time is not exceeded and who communicates the status of the incident to the
user.
The incident life cycle as shown in Figure 4 consists of incident detection and recording, classification
and assignment, investigation and diagnosis, resolution and recovery, and finally incident closure. We
will shortly describe these different steps next.
Incident detection and recording
When a user encounters difficulties in continuing her work, she calls the Service Desk, the first-line
support for incident handling in the organization. It is an easy to memorize number, **505, because it
visually resembles the word “SOS”. If the difficulty cannot be solved immediately, the Service Desk
registers it as an incident. An incident ticket is then created in Peregrine and all possible incident
details are entered in the ticket. From this point onwards, the Service Desk is the owner of the incident
and is responsible for the timely handling of the incident and the communication to the user. The user
needs to be updated regularly on the status of the incident. An incident can also be detected by
operational personnel. Operational personnel could either be the cause of the incident, or they were
just able to detect the incident in their day-to-day activities before a user noticed any service
disruption. In this case it is a common procedure that they register the incident in Peregrine. They will
then be the owner of the incident and coordinate the incident until it is solved. In the remainder of this
research we will focus on the normal procedure that the Service Desk coordinates incidents.
Classification and assignment
By asking targeted questions, the Call Desk can estimate the priority of the incident. The priority is set
by determining the impact and urgency of the incident. The impact of the incident must be determined
from the company’s perspective and indicates the (potential) financial loss the incident can cause.
It is possible that the Service Desk is able to handle the incident, but cannot do this immediately. The
incident is then assigned to the Service Desk. In most cases the Service Desk does not know what is
causing the incident or how to solve it, so they must make an appeal to people with more expertise:
second-line support groups, having more specialist skills, time or other resources to solve incidents.
Because the Service Desk inquired the user about the incident, they will have an idea on what could be
causing the incident or at least in what area to start investigating it. In Peregrine a list of teams appears
that could be consulted for this kind of incident. The Service Desk assigns the most suitable team – in
their view – to handle the incident.
People from the IT department are split up into teams that each has their own specialization. These are
virtual teams, because they could comprise people who work in different divisions and/or at different
locations. They all have access to Peregrine, and when an incident is assigned to a team, it appears in
the mailbox of the specific team and each team member can assign the incident to himself or herself.
The team member that assigns the incident to himself/herself is called the incident handler. When the
incident appears is assigned to the wrong team, it is sent back to the sender.
Investigation and diagnosis
The incident handler will investigate the incident and try to find a solution or a workaround. It is
possible that a solution can only be implemented after some time, e.g. at a new release. A workaround
could be suggested that will help the user until the real solution is implemented. When a team member
cannot identify the underlying cause of the incident and propose a solution or workaround to it, the
incident can be further rerouted to a higher-line support group, even an external vendor, until a
solution to the incident is found.
Resolution and recovery
The incident handler implements the solution or the workaround, takes all necessary recovery actions
and updates the documentation of the incident in Peregrine by describing how she solved the incident.
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Incident closure
The Service Desk contacts the user to make sure the proposed solution is satisfactory. If this is not the
case, the incident is sent back to the incident handler. The Service Desk closes the incident when the
user is satisfied with the proposed solution.
Incident briefing
Every morning the most important incidents that occurred the day before or the incidents that are still
in the process of being handled are discussed. Employees who solved the incident or who know more
about it, explain the cause of the incident and the (proposed) solution to a public comprising general
managers, incident process coordinators, service delivery owners, and other IT staff that is involved in
Incident Management or just is interested. The briefing can be attended ‘live’ at the head office of the
financial institution or at another office via videoconference. Incidents are thoroughly analyzed and
measures are taken to prevent the same kind of incident in the future.

4

OBSERVATIONS

For this work we applied a qualitative research approach using ethnography (Agar 1986; Hammersley
& Atkinson, 1995; Myers 1999). We performed more than 800 hours of observations at the financial
institution to obtain a clear picture of how the financial institution handles IT-related incidents. In this
time frame we followed all the important actors of the Incident Management process, who are depicted
in figure 3, in their daily work: the incident manager, the service delivery owners, the incident
coordinators, the team leaders and some of the incident handlers. The hours at the financial institution
were mainly spent on observation, general discussions with the people about their work, attending
incident briefings and Incident Management process evaluation meetings, studying the previous
Incident Management data from the Peregrine application and studying internal reports. Data analysis
was conducted by interpreting the transcripts of our observations. Through this active observation, we
were able to examine the mindful infrastructure that is in place at the Incident Management process.
We will give an overview of the HRO characteristics of the Incident Management process according
to the five HRO principles that make up the mindful infrastructure as shown in figure 2.
Preoccupation with failure
There is a good infrastructure in place to report incidents, and employees use it frequently. We have
noticed that, even when a small error occurs, people jump in to intervene and offer their assistance. A
good example of their preoccupation with failure is the establishment of the incident briefing.
However, not everybody in the organization is aware of the importance of learning from incidents
through such a briefing. Only the highest priority incidents are discussed at the incident briefing. Some
employees apparently do not feel like justifying their way of handling incidents, and so label and
incident with a lower than actual priority in order to avoid having to appear at the incident briefings.
There are procedures in place how to handle certain incidents. But because of time pressure,
procedures are not always updated after handling a new kind of incident, or are not entered in detail. A
second-line incident handler expressed us his concern about such incomplete information in
procedures: “I easily loose ten to fifteen minutes when I am dealing with incomplete information. But
what if for one reason or another that slack time would not be available?” This employee was very
concerned that he might face surprises that lead to failures, but apparently not everybody in the
organization is that preoccupied.
Reluctance to simplify
The financial institution stimulates diversity in their staff by hiring people with non-typical experience
for their job. For example, at one specific division of the IT department from where we were doing our
research, out of about twelve staff members there were not even two people with the same background
education. Moreover, the financial institution stimulates job rotation, which also contributes to the
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requisite variety in their staff. Because the people are so divergent, the situations they face can be
viewed from many different perspectives. This creates skepticism, leading to an instructive climate
when people interact with one another and a qualitatively better assessment of the situation.
To oversee the complexity of the processes involved, the financial institution appointed Service
Delivery Owners. Service Delivery Owners are the “boundary spanners” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p
11) who enable a successful end-to-end service throughout the organization.
However, at some points the financial institution does simplify. Key Performance Indicators,
frequently applied by mainstream organizations (Van Den Eede et al., 2006), are used to measure the
performance of different incident solving teams in a standardized manner. Mainly by paying attention
to these evaluation criteria, incident handlers could loose their focus on other aspects of their work.
Sensitivity to operations
Several means are used to develop a strong situational awareness at the financial institution. There is a
good intranet in place, where the latest developments are communicated and exhaustive information is
available about the day-to-day activities of all divisions and teams. There are various internal
magazines and news bulletins that communicate the big picture of the organization. Monthly an
internal news report is shown in the theatre of the financial institution, every episode showing a.o. a
different employee who is followed on a normal working day. There are monthly briefings by the
Chief Information Officer to communicate the future plans of the IT department and to give an
opportunity for discussion and feedback. The financial institution’s external strategies are also
elucidated by means of these media. There was for example an advertising campaign on national
television, and the purpose of this campaign was explained on the intranet.
Commitment to resilience
The incident handlers we have interviewed were all very committed to their work in resiliently
responding to incidents. They spoke about their work with passion and regarded themselves
irreplaceable in their ‘firefighting’. The financial institution shows their commitment to resilience in
the incident briefings discussed previously. There is a good resilient infrastructure in place by informal
networks. People have their connections throughout the organization and therefore perfectly know
whom to contact when a critical situation arises.
However, there is not much time for training in handling incidents. As a senior executive stated, “this
is a waist of time, because there are many incidents in real-life that incident handlers can learn from”.
Deference to expertise
Incident handlers at the financial institution make up the front-line for responding to incidents. When
an incident occurs, there sometimes is hardly any time to ask superiors for permission to take
important decisions. Incident handlers are allowed to make these important decisions when the
necessity emerges and there are no procedures to handle them. Later on, incident handlers must justify
their actions, but there will be no penalty for bypassing their superiors. It is remarkable that this is not
documented anywhere, but all incident handlers agreed that this was a common practice.

5

DISCUSSION

All HRO characteristics are – at least to some extent – present in the Incident Management process.
However, the findings from the case study show that there are also indications of less mindful and
non-HRO like behavior. HROs have different mechanisms at their disposal to improve the level of
mindfulness. Therefore, our main conclusion is that considerable opportunities remain unseized to lift
the HRO qualities to a still higher level. In this respect we advise the financial institution to improve
their level of mindfulness. As Roberts and Bea (2001) state, HROs invest disproportionately more
money in training people to recognize and respond to anomalies than other organizations. Training
does not only teach people how to react to specific situations, but also how to respond to situations
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that are not in the training manual (Roberts & Bea, 2001). Employees in HROs also learn to develop
responses that can detect dangers (Roberts & Bea, 2001).
HROs invest a lot of time in reviews in order to learn from their incidents (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p
41). Incident analysis helps in building an organizational memory of what happened and why,
develops a science of incidents that can happen in the organization and identifies parts of the system
that should have redundancies (Roberts & Bea, 2001). Cooke (2003) calls this an “incident learning
system”: “the collection of organizational capabilities that enable the organization to extract useful
information from incidents of all kinds and to use this information to improve organizational
performance over time”. According to Cooke (2003), an effective incident learning system is
important for continuous improvement of the capability of the Incident Management process. Without
such a system, pre-cursor incidents are only visible with the benefit of hindsight. But with an incident
learning system in place, an organization can prevent serious accidents and may involve into an HRO
over time (Cooke, 2003). The incident briefing set up by the financial institution is good step in the
direction of such an incident learning system.
Another way of becoming more aware of dangers, and training incident handlers in becoming more
resilient, is by simulating an incident in the organization. Simulated incidents reinforce the idea that
people must not become complacent, that the organization believes that accidents might happen, and
that it worries about its ability to respond (Roberts & Bea, 2001). It also teaches people in the
organization to formulate appropriate responses in new situations and gives people the opportunity to
see what responses work and how, so they can locate the weak spots in their organization (Roberts &
Bea, 2001).

6

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have built up a discussion that confronts a trusted principle from Organizational
Learning – learning through trial and error processes – with insights from High Reliability
Organizations. The paradox consists of the fact that organizational learning – at least the mutual
learning aspects of it – contribute to a loosely coupled organization and a suboptimal performance. We
have argued that because of the absence of trial-and-error learning in high hazard environments, HROs
are more successful than Learning Organizations in terms of efficiency.
Organizations do not only need to be efficient, they need to be reliable as well. Reliability is the
number one concern for HROs. HROs manage to operate efficiently while staying highly reliable
because they have a certain state of mindfulness, the general term for the five distinctive qualities they
possess.
Through a case study of the IT Incident Management process at a large European financial services
provider, we investigated how people involved in a process of such a mainstream organization, where
reliability is of great concern, can learn from HROs to balance both virtues of reliability/effectiveness
and flexibility/efficiency. Our observations suggest that HROs may offer valuable insights for
mainstream organizations like financial institutions on how to improve their level of mindfulness.
There are some examples of past studies that look at mainstream organizations from an HRO
perspective, e.g. investment banks (Roberts & Libuser, 1993) and software firms (Vogus &
Welbourne, 2003), but the principles that make a HRO highly reliable have not been examined as
detailed before at non-HROs. Although this study has been carried out at the idiosyncratic context of
the IT department of a large financial institution, an environment characterized by critical business
processes and high awareness of the potential impact of incidents, we expect our conclusions to be
applicable to other high hazard environments as well. The validation of this assumption will however
require further research in these environments.
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